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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT:
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2-(3)(j),
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the 1980 Amended Ground Lease or law required written notice of
default as a condition precedent to suit for breach of an express provision of the Lease or
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell
699 P. 2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).
2. Whether these Middletons are jointly liable for the acts of Anthony Middleton
when Medical Leasing knew that Anthony did not have authority to act for these
Middletons.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell
supra.
3.

Whether a threat of litigation by one tenant-in-common constitutes a breach

of the lease, or whether all tenants-in-common must join as plaintiffs in any legal action
against their tenant.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell
supra.
4. Whether the common-law rule, that tenants-in-common made separate leases with
their common tenant, applies, or whether under the Amended Lease or by operation of law
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Middletons agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the torts or breach of contract of
another tenant-in-common.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness; interpretation of
contract is question of law and trial court's interpretation of a contract as a matter of law
is accorded no particular weight. Kimball v. Campbell, supra. Determination of whether
writing is ambiguous is question of law. Correction-of-error standard accords no deference
to trial court. D'Aston v. D'Aston. 808 P.2d 111, 114 (Utah App. 1990).
5. Whether Anthony Middleton's action constitute a breach of the express provisions
of Paragraph 8 of the Amended Lease.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbett,
supra.
6.

Whether there was a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by

Anthony Middleton, a tenant-in-common, and, if so, whether such breach, based on acts
which are unauthorized and not ratified, results in joint liability for all tenants-in-common.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review for correctness. Kimball v. Campbell
supra.
7. Are all Middletons jointly liable for breach of contract and/or breach of covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, when Medical Leasing neither pleaded joint liability nor
alleged facts to support a claim of joint liability, and where Medical Leasing did not move
to amend its pleadings to assert joint liability?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review by Supreme Court for correctness.
Trial court's conclusions of law are not given special deference. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d
1174 (Utah 1989).
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8. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Medical Leasing attorneys' fees where
(a) the verdict did not specify a finding of a breach of the express terms of the Lease, (b)
there was no breach of the express terms of the Lease, and (c) Medical Leasing did not give
Middletons notice as required by the Lease.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review as a question of law. Cottonwood Mall
v. Sine. 830 P. 2d 266 (Utah 1992).
9. Whether Middletons are entitled to attorneys' fees for proceedings in the trial
court and on this appeal, or whether on remand the trial court should determine if
Middletons are entitled to attorneys' fees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: De novo review as a question of law. Cottonwood Mall
v. Sine, supra.
ADOPTION OF ISSUES AND ARGUMENT IN BRIEF OF OTHER APPELLANTS:
These Appellants adopt the following issues and points in Argument from the Brief
of Anthony W. Middleton, et al.:
Issues:
I.

Whether admission of MLL's evidence regarding the Zions litigation was prejudicial
error.

VI.

Whether MLL failed to present substantial evidence to establish that threats of
litigation by Anthony W. Middleton, Jr. caused damaged to MLL.

VII.

Whether, as a matter of law, a threat of litigation not followed by suit and
adjudication favorable to MLL is legally sufficient to satisfy the "improper means"
element of MLL's tortious interference claims.

VIII. Whether the trial court erred in failing to rule as a matter of law that Middletons, as
landlords to MLL and owners of the real property in question, were privileged to
interfere in negotiations for sublease of the property.
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IX.

Whether the jury instructions erroneously stated the applicable law respecting
damages, thereby permitting a double recovery and relieving MLL of its duty to
mitigate.

ARGUMENT:
POINT I:

ADMISSION OF MLL'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ZIONS
LAWSUIT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

POINT VI: MLL'S CLAIMED DAMAGES WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
POINT VII: AS A MATTER OF LAW, MLL FAILED TO SATISFY THE IMPROPER
PURPOSE AND IMPROPER MEANS ELEMENTS OF ITS TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE CLAIM.
POINT VIII: MIDDLETONS, AS OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY
AND LANDLORDS TO MLL WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED TO
INTERFERE IN SUBLEASE NEGOTIATIONS.
POINT IX: THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED A DOUBLE
RECOVERY AND THE JUDGMENT IMPROPERLY RELIEVED MLL
OF ITS DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ORDINANCES,
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE:

RULES

AND

Section 68-3-1, Utah Code Ann. which reads:
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict
with, the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws of this
state, and so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical
conditions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is hereby adopted,
and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state.
This statute and its application are discussed in Point IV of the Argument.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

Medical Leasing, Ltd. ("MLL"), as Tenant, leased ground from the Middletons,
owners as tenants-in-common. MLL was negotiating with Roger Boyer ("Boyer"), president
mb.wgp.mid.bnef.2/8/93.# 14
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of The Boyer Company ("Boyer Co."), for the sublease and development of the property.
When those negotiations failed, MLL sued the Middletons based solely on acts of Anthony
Middleton, for (as pertinent to this appeal) (a) the tort of intentional interference with
prospective economic relations, (b) breach of the lease and (c) breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT,

The jury found in special interrogatories:

(a) Anthony and his wife, Carol

Middleton,1 (i) intentionally interfered with MLL's prospective economic relationship with
Boyer Co. (R. at 1569) and (ii) breached the express terms of the lease "and/or" the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (R. at 1572), and that (b) the other Middletons did
not interfere (R. at 1569-70) or breach the lease (R. at 1572-73), implicitly finding MLL had
been told and knew Anthony was not authorized to act for the others, and (c) MLL should
recover general damages of $2,582,780 from Anthony and Carol Middleton (R. at 1574) and
punitive damages of $75,000 from Anthony Middleton (R. at 1584).
After the jury's verdict, the trial court ruled that, the jury verdict notwithstanding, all
Middletons were jointly and severally liable for the breach of lease by Anthony and Carol
Middleton (R. at 2962) solely because they signed the Lease as "Landlord." After denying
Middletons' motions for JNOV and new trial, the Court entered judgment against all
Middletons for $2,582,780 plus interest, attorney's fees of $275,000, costs, and for $75,000
in punitive damages against Anthony Middleton. R. at 2964.

1

Carol Middleton's liability could be based only on a finding that her husband, Anthony Middleton, was
her agent. See Special Interrogatory No. 25, R. at 1543, and Answer to Special Verdict, 1 1, 4, R. at 1569,
2572.
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C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.2

The Middletons own as tenants in common3 10 acres of raw ground at the northwest
corner of 7th East and 39th South in Salt Lake County, Utah. Dr. R. P. Middleton and Dr.
Anthony Middleton, (Sr.), brothers, and Delores Middleton, widow of another brother,
originally owned the property. R. P. Middleton's one-third interest in the property was
conveyed to his children, Dr. Richard G. Middleton (R. at 4972), Dr. Mary Middleton Dahl
and Victoria Ann Stearn, and R. G.'s wife, Jane. The one-third interest of Anthony
Middleton, Sr. was conveyed to his sons, Dr. Anthony Middleton, Jr. (R. at 4317) and Dr.
George Middleton, and their wives, Carol and Jean. The aged widow, Delores Middleton,
a resident of the District of Columbia (R. at 321, K 9; 412, 5 9), has retained her one-third
interest.
MLL is a partnership (Amended Complaint, 1 4, R. at 320) whose general partners
are Dr. Wallace H. Ring, Dr. John C. Adair and Dr. Harry C. Wong. R. at 3988.
In 1975, MLL's predecessor proposed to construct a surgical center on two acres of
the property. Because the Middletons wanted to keep the parcel intact rather than lease
only the two acres, the entire parcel was leased for 50 years with a 30-year option to renew
(the "Ground Lease") R. at 4999,1. 22. The rent was set at a modest level4 to cover just the
two acres of land to be used for the surgical center. R. at 4999, 1. 19-22.

The Middletons

2

The lengthy Statement of Facts is not necessary to raise or identify the issues asserted in this Brief.
Indeed, the issues raised in this Brief by these Middletons are all issues of law; and only Issue VI and the
corresponding Point VI in the Brief of Anthony Middleton, et al., adopted by these Middletons, challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence. The detail is provided, however to assist the Court in understanding the
case. The evidence is stated in the light most favorable to the findings of the jury in its answers to
interrogatories in the Special Verdict, R. at 1569. See Koer v. Mavfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1966).
3

Ownership as tenants in common was alleged in the amended complaint, 11 5-13, R. at 321-22, and
admitted in Middletons' answers, R. at 391-92 and 412. See also R. at 899, 1. 16-18.
4

For the whole parcel, the rent was only S260 per month during construction of the surgical center, and
$6,240 for the following year. The rent was S 15,000 for the fifth year of the Lease. Ex. P-l, 1 1.2.
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believed they would be able to participate in further development rentals because if MLL
undertook to sublease the remaining property to a major independent developer, as a
practical matter, the developer or the developer's lender would likely insist that MLL obtain
the Middletons' agreement to subordinate5 (i.e., mortgage) the fee to the development
lender's lien (R. P. Middleton, R. at unnumbered page following 5701) or that the lenders
would require consent to the development or changes in the lease; then the parties would
work together on the development and Middletons would participate therein. R. at 4998-99,
5001-2, 5004. The Middletons subordinated to MLL's construction lender their fee interest
in the two acres where the surgical center would be built (Ex. P-l at 9-14), but expressly did
not subordinate the rest. Id. at 14.
Five years later, Middletons were asked to subordinate another .75 acre. An
Amended Ground Lease (Ex. P-3) ("Amended Lease") made in 1980 provided for the
requested subordination.6 Ex. P-3 at 7-12. It changed the renewal period from 30 to 15
years.
Each Middleton signed the Amended Lease separately as "Landlord" and it refers
throughout to "Landlord" in the singular. The Lease is silent concerning whether the parties
intended the Middletons, as tenants-in-common, to be jointly liable for the acts of one of
them.
The Amended Lease specifically states the Middletons are not required to give
further consent or subordination for development, but that such consent is "solely at

5

The original Ground Lease in 1975 stated: "Tenant has represented to Landlord that it will be
impossible for it to finance the construction of the Surgical Center without the subordination of the Landlord
of its fee title to the two acres. . . ." Ex. P-l at 10.
0

For the first three years of the Amended Lease, rent for the whole property was only S25,200 per year.
MLL was responsible for utilities and taxes.
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landlord's discretion." J 8. Therefore, if MLL asked for consent or subordination for
development, the Middletons anticipated asking for more lease income in return. R. at
5004. MLL had a similar view: if MLL asked Middletons for consent, Middletons would
ask for more money. Dr. Wong, R. at 4916.
The Amended Lease contains at paragraph 12 a "notice and right to cure provision"
benefitting MLL and its lenders and subtenants:
Landlord further agrees that in the event of any default by Tenant under this Ground
lease, any mortgagee or other holder of a security interest in Tenant's leasehold or
improvements and/or any assignee or subtenant of Tenant may cure such default
within the time allowed Tenant for same hereunder and continue this Ground Lease
in full force and effect.
The following additional provisions of the Amended Lease are pertinent: paragraph 6,
regarding default; paragraph 8, regarding development of the remaining property;
paragraphs 12 and 13 regarding notices; and paragraph 16 regarding attorneys' fees. These
provisions are set out in the Argument.
Three weeks after the Amended Lease was signed, MLL subleased a part of the
property to Zions Bank. ("Zions Sublease" dated August 22, 1980, Ex. P-4). Coinciding with
the Amended Lease's notice and right to cure clause, Zions Sublease paragraph 15 reads:
In the event Lessor receives any notice of any default under said Amended Ground
Lease, Lessor shall promptly, no later than three (3) days from the receipt of said
notice by Lessor, deliver to Lessee a copy of said notice. Lessee may elect, in its sole
discretion, to cure said default on behalf of Lessor and thereby reinstate and continue
in effect said Amended Ground Lease. In the event Lessee remedies any such
default [Lessor is responsible for Lessee's costs].
Although the Middletons were not asked to subordinate, Zions insisted that it needed
Middletons' consent to its sublease and MLL insisted that consent be given by the
Middletons without compensation. Ex. P-6. Zions, even over MLL's objections (R. at 4161),
mb.wgp.mid.brief.2/8/93.# 14
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sued MLL and the Middletons for a declaration that consent was not necessary or, if
necessary, that MLL must obtain it from Middletons. Zions Utah Bancorporation v. Medical
Leasing Limited, et al. See Zions' Complaint, Ex. P-10. The Zions' complaint alleged:
"Paragraph 8 of the Lease requires the consent of the Middletons" (if 14); "Medical Leasing
asserts that the consent of the Middletons is not required" (1 16); "Medical Leasing refuses
to procure the consent of Middletons" (1 20); and "it is uncertain whether the consent of
Middletons is required ..." (1 22). In 1985, the parties reached a settlement by which MLL
paid the Middletons $21,000 (R. at 4162,1. 5-9) and the parties agreed to a mutual release
of all claims and a stipulation that restated paragraph 8 of the 1980 Amended Ground Lease
to cure the "uncertainty" Zions had pleaded as to whether consent to subleases or
development of the property was or was not required and under what conditions. Ex. P-16
at 4-5.
Prior to and during the Zions case, Anthony Middleton and George P. Middleton and
their wives were represented by one law firm and the other Middletons had different
counsel. R. at 4030, 4033; see Exs. P-8, P-ll, P-15. Different positions were taken by each
group. Id.
In 1987, MLL began discussing development of the remaining property (5.135 acres)
with Boyer Co. (R. at 4050) expressly on a non-subordinated basis. Because MLL did not
want to share any proceeds from such development with the Middletons, the Middletons
were not told of the negotiations (Ring, R. at 4170, 4181) until 1989 (Dr. Wong, R. at 489495) when Boyer insisted on it.
In June 1988, MLL and Boyer Co. signed a letter agreement (Ex. P-22) (the
"Development Agreement") for Boyer Co. to sublease and develop the remaining 5.135
acres, conditioned, among other things, upon Boyer Co. getting the property zoned
mb.wep.mid.brief.2/8/93.#14
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commercial and the parties signing a sublease by December 31, 1988. In December 1988,
the time to sign the sublease was extended to January 31, 1989. Ex. P-32.
The Boyer Co. obtained rezoning and removed the contingencies of the Development
Agreement (Ex. P-32), but MLL did not prepare the first draft of the proposed sublease
until February 3, 1989, after the Development Agreement expired. Boyer Co.'s lawyer,
Victor Taylor of Kimball, Parr, Crockett & Waddoups, on March 14, 1989 wrote (Ex. D-14)
MLL's lawyer, John Parsons, that a number of "major business hurdles" must be resolved.
He identified changes MLL would need to make in the Amended Lease, including:
1)

MLL must obtain Middletons' consent to the Boyer Co. sublease; and

2)

MLL and the Middletons must again amend the Amended Lease to

provide that if MLL defaults on the Amended Lease the Middletons will "attorn" to
Boyer Co. and will perform MLL's obligations to Boyer Co.7 under the sublease and
Middletons would accept Boyer Co.'s performance of its obligation under the
sublease by Boyer or by any sublessee of or lender to Boyer; and
3)

measuring the rent to MLL in part on Boyer Co.'s rentals received from

subtenants "violates the letter and spirit" of the provision in paragraph 8 of the
Amended Lease under which MLL might sublease without Middleton consent,8 and
that "the Sublessee [Boyer Co.] is unwilling to take the risk of such violation, the
result of which could be termination" of the Amended Lease;

7

This attornment provision would impose MLL's duties to Boyer Co. on Middletons. Under the Amended
Lease, Middletons are not required to do so. The trial court so ruled. R. 301-2.
8

Taylor said "having rental payable under the sublease determined on the basis of the rental income from
the premises violates the letter and spirit of this provision;' referring to 1 8 of the Amended Lease that an
independent third party could develop without subordination. Ex. D-14. Taylor was referring to the text of
the Amended Lease. He testified that his opinion did not change when he later was provided the text of
paragraph 8 as modified by the Zions Stipulation. R. at 5439.
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MLL objected to Boyer making requests of the Middletons foi
anticipating the Middletons would ask for more rent, P
was

^ \ •:-;.

^i concessions,

•

pi sit it n

-J '-Iv.i- < j . b lawyer was wrong on the first two points; it refused to change the rent

clause and said Boyer Co. ought to be content with the "right to cure" clause that /ions
-ni clause demanded.9 MLL's lawyer wrote to Boyer Co.

ci^c;-Uon April 10, 1989 that .

"MLL believes the consent of the Middleton's is not only

unnecessary h-.

i request unreasonable . . ."

R. at 4399, Ex. D-15. M; L told Boyer the Middletons were "litigious" as evidenced by the
Zions action, whenin fact Aiiwjici- ii^ ,i ^
and MLL.

Exs. P-il and IM:.

.*: •

.

:

^

m: sucu by Zlons

MLL insisted that Boyer * .« was -:ii.;J bv the

Development Agreement to sign the proposed sublease as is, threatening *uit H neeessary
R ,ii IS71),
Boyer Co. explained to its mortgage broker, Bonne\n e .Muituage

; ..;

nature i it' the proposed transaction and asked if financing could be arranged for the project
using the proposed sublease. Banks, R. at 5396. Boyer Co.'s mortgage broker asked its
legal counsel, Greg

-

•• ••

-. .-m. •

-'meii, foi an opinion as to the

"financeability of the proposed arrangement," and
If in your professional opinion the proposed ground lease(s) are not
acceptable to our investors, please so advise at your earliest convenience so that we
can so advise our client. [Ex. D-17].
By letter of \ M \ .-<;. ^<^ .
(

ri p arl y a n c j

:

* *

• "•:. Mile Mortgage

Boyer Co. that Middletons' consent and attornment, inter alia, would be

required by a lender, that he agreed "heartily" with Taylor's Maieh 11, I'W letter, ami that

9

Boyer Co.'s lawyer, Mr. Taylor, testified as to the purpose and importance of the proposed provisions
(R. at 5431-33, 5498-99, 5501-02).
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the proposed transaction was too complex even if "very substantial changes are made in the
leases." Ex. D-18.
On July 25, 1989, Drs. Ring, Wong and Adair, partners in MLL, met with Boyer, his
attorney, Vic Taylor, and Greg Gardner, his employee. R. 4116. They discussed the major
business hurdles Taylor had raised in his March 14, 1989 letter. Parsons, R. at 4531. Dr.
Ring interrupted and said "we are not going to the Middletons." Id. at 4532. According to
Dr. Ring, Boyer said10 "we can work around that," (Dr. Ring, R. at 4121,1. 5-6) and that he
wanted "to make a deal, not break a deal." R. at 4121. Although the Amended Lease
directed that all notices be sent to Dr. Richard P. Middleton, nevertheless, Boyer told the
group he wanted to speak to Dr. Anthony Middleton, Jr. ("Anthony"), his friend, about the
project. R. at 4122. MLL continued to insist that the sublease be signed without contacting
the Middletons at all. Boyer stated to MLL that he was concerned about getting into a
"litigation box," that is, he feared he would be sued either way he went. R. at 4121.
Finally, MLL acquiesced and agreed Boyer could talk to Anthony Middleton. R. at
4298. Boyer approached Anthony at church in late July, 1989 (R. at 5530), told him briefly
of his proposed development and said he wanted to meet with him to discuss it. This was
the first time any of the Middletons knew of the negotiations between MLL and Boyer Co.
(R. at 4895, 4981, and 5530) which had been going on for almost two years. Two weeks
later, Anthony talked with Boyer who told him MLL wanted Boyer Co. to develop retail
shops and offices on the property. Ex. P-37. Knowing no more, Anthony recorded in his
diary:

10

Middletons objected to Dr. Ring's hearsay testimony on this subject. R. at 4119.
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Roger's company is so strong that they can do w ithout subordination, and I
suspect we are dead in the water the way that stupid contract is put together by
Uncle Dick and [his lawyer]. I am going to meet with Roger this coming Tuesday
morning to go over the plans and see if there is something that can be done about
it, but my strong hunch is that we are sunk and will have to live with the idea that
those birds will derive a very handsome income off the development without actually
including the actual owners of the land at all. [Ex. P-37]
Mt'iinwhik', Ml I , 1 )i Wnnii, who worked daily in the same hospital with D. Richard
G. Middleton ("R.G."), was sent by MLL to tell R.G. that Boyer was going to iaik in
Anthony. ri:-.-. *.

: *•

•:

.ospital 1 lall ai id Di Wong said Boyer was going to develop the

property without subordination, that Boyer was going to talk to Anthony about it and asked
if R.G. wanted to attend

*

at 4895, IW"

Di Wtw, testified R.G. said his

presence at the meeting was not necessary if subordination were not requested, that Anthony
only represents a third of the Middleton family, an^
.m-t

i

>

••• •* l w ; i \ %

Vnthony's. R. at 4910.

i Vi Vigust 7 or 8, 1989, Boyer met with Anthony. Bo\n inld \nlhrny lh.il lit1

JIIJI

his lavw n s \s t'T t1 of* t»M' opinion that Middletons' consent to a sublease was needed. R. 5534,
1. 5-9; R. 5601,1.19-20. Boyer also told Anthony that MLL had threatened to sue Bom i i»
if it d;^

>

- ^5b>, 5540. But Boyer did not tell Anthony the

specifics of why his lawyer said Middletons' consent was necessary, nor of the concessions
necessary to make the

SUPUMM1

\nthony said he was glad Boyer was

developing the property.
On September 26, IW/ -n .

KOU\\ Greg Gardner, Dr.

Ring and Anthony. Dr. Ring testified:
THE WITNESS: Roger continued his addressing Tony
And he had in
is hand a document. The document was the Ground Lease, as modified by the Zions'
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declaration or the Zions' determination. And He said " - And he read from it and
He said: "It seems to me that this is very clear, Tony, that your consent is not
required."
MR. BURBIDGE: What, if anything, did Tony Middleton say in response?
A. He said "Well, I don't think that makes any difference." He said, "If a
stake goes in the ground, the Middletons will sue." (indicating) ["]Fm not saying I'll
sue, but I'll guarantee you there are members of the Middleton family that will sue,
because we have a right to participate."
Q. All right. Now, did anyone ask Tony what the basis of this statement was?
A. Roger did.
Q. Did Tony respond?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say?
A. He says: "As the rightful landowners, we have a right to participate on any
development that's goes on out there on a" -- he says, "It is just a philosophical basis.
It may not be in the contract, but, philosophically, we have that right." [R. at 412627]
Boyer said he could not go forward with the threat of litigation. [R. at 4135]
On cross-examination, Dr. Ring testified he said "whatever [Boyer Co. feels] it needs from
the Middletons its something they should obtain from them." R. at 4440.
Anthony recorded in his diary regarding the September 26, 1989 meeting with Boyer,
Greg Gardner and Dr. Ring:
We sat down and went through the history of the contract and leases, me
giving my side of it and Wally Ring giving his side of it, and in a rather amicable
session I felt that everybody had agreed that there would be some compensation paid
the Middleton family. . . .
At any rate, we got the point made since then that the only thing we are
interested in is increasing the income realized from the property in return for which
mb.wgp.mid.bnef.2/8/93.# 14
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the Middleton family will agree not to challenge the contract in court. The way
things now stand is that Wally understands that we are bargaining and deliberating
to see how much of an increase is acceptable. . . . Roger Boyer is aware of that as
well, and I pointed out to Roger that Wally as a point of principle has stated several
times to me that the Boyer Company is going to have to give a little something up
to make this contract go, and I asked Roger to see if there isn't any way they can do
that. [Ex. P-37]11
(in (K'luk i Ill, 1(AS(I„ l)i Woiw mil 1 >i\ Ring met with Anthony at the Marriott
Hotel.
R. at

v Ring presented a possible revision to the Amended Lease, a "revised escalator."
i HI kmitg (csiitiaii

4L?>^.

A. Tony said . . ."I've got to have some kind of a bone to throw to the family.
I can't just walk away from this. Tell me that you are willing to pay something." He
said: "I know I can do it for $25,000."
yylcj j sa j < j ? »j ( j o n

L liiiiiiv

^ Could talk my people into $10,000."

"There is nothing in here that gives you any immediate money, and the
only escalator that you will get to your monthly, or your annual income, would be that
increase that you would get as the rents go up."
And he said, "Well, you realize that if we don't get this, we are going lo sue?"
And I became a little hot under the collar.
Q

Just tell me what you said.

A. And I told him there was no way that we were going u» go aluiui w iih lli.n
kind of extortion.
That's when he came up with "Well, I've got to have some kind of a bone to
throw to the family or I know there's going to be a lawsuit." [R. at 4141-42]12
r first Tuesday in November 1989, at IIK 1 ort
Douglas Club ; >r. Ring told Anthony that MLL had decided that it would not pay anything

11

Dr. Ring testified further and other witnesses testified about the September 26, 1989 meeting: Ring,
R. at 4432-46; the testimony in the text is consistent with the other witnesses' testimony or is more favorable
to MI L than the other witnesses' testimony.
12

Other witnesses testified about the October 10, 1989 meeting: Anthony Middleton, Jr.: R. at 4367-70;
the testimony in the text is consistent with the other witnesses' testimony or is more favorable to MLL than
the other witnesses' testimony.
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to the Middletons. R. at 4142-43. Dr. Ring testified that Anthony said "If we don't get some
money, we are going to sue." R. at 4144.
On November 11,1989, Boyer held a meeting at his house. The meeting was secretly
recorded by Dr. Ring.

Ex. D-27.

Boyer proposed a deal where both MLL and the

Middletons would participate as equity owners in development of the property. Id. at 3.
Boyer was making the proposal because he wanted to develop the property, but it was at
a stalemate. Id. at 1, 17. Anthony expressed his enthusiasm for exploring Boyer's proposal.
Id. at 12. Boyer said he did not think he was bound by the development agreement and that
he would have to obtain financing to develop the property. Id. at 18. Dr. Ring responded:
MR. RING: I think what my position was at that meeting is that we felt that
what Roger was asking for here was nothing that would increase the risk of the
Middletons. It was something that should be drafted because it was nothing but a
favor. If you will, as any responsible landlord would recognize the responsibilities
to do so, and what you're saying is give us the right to cure, give us some piece of
presence so that we won't be sued, and I think that we did not come away from there
with the feeling that that was available. As a matter of fact, as you said right off the
bat, you said it then and you've said it at every meeting we've had, is that if any
development happens out there, you're going to sue.
MR. ANTHONY MIDDLETON: No, that's only half of what I said. There
would be - very likely be a suit entered if zero participation on the part of the
owners. [Ex. D-27 at 18.]
Boyer was attempting to find a solution:
MR. RING: . . . If you remember, the last time there was, I believe, on the
part of you, Roger, and you, Tony, we were talking about taking what would be
received from Roger and dividing it. That isn't what I had in mind.
So when I left there I thought what you were asking for was the future
increase on the land, not what MR. BOYER: I thought that's what both of you said. That's the implication.
He said we would litigate if they don't participate, and you suggested that I think we
have a binding agreement.
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MR. RING: I think we do.
MR. BOYER: What my point is, if we don't proceed I think the in lplication
is that we litigate. If we did proceed, the implication is we litigate.
MR. RING: There is a third opportunity. There is an opportunity to litigate,
and that's simply to go to court and get clarification of what might be required of the
landowner without any further approval, and rather than take the passive approach
(inaudible), we can take the active approach and find out what it's all about.
This is what happened last time. We got it clarified (inaudible). That isn't
litigation in the sense that we would be trying to force your contract, it would be a
litigation attempt to try to clarify so that we can proceed without it being litigated.
MR. ANTHONY MIDDLETON: Basically, the reason we're all meeting here
is to avoid litigation in the first place. I'd like to hear what your proposal is, Roger.
I don't think I can understand what you're talking about without a scenario, and I
suspect you fellows wouldn't understand without running it past your attorneys. [Ex.
D-27 at 32, 33]
At those meetings Anthony stated he was in favor of Bow
i- it; iliai me Middletons would nc: sue, saui ik believed tne
Middletons would agree not to contest the contract in court if more rent were pan!

|K

44l)2-(>3 | He alMi said \w helievvd tint if the development went forward without additional
rent, that it was likely some member of the family in this or future generations would sue.
R. at 4463, 44f>4 He Mini lie leit phiinsophicallv th.it in Middlrtons were entitled to share
in rent from any future development, R, at 4440, 4446-47.
At these meetings held among Anthony, Mown .ind Ml I u4piesentatives, never did
Anthony say to MLL or to Boyer that he spoke for the rest of the Middletons; MLL knew
he did not and never made any inquiry of these Middletons as h» then \)\ isitii mi or Anthony's
an"

•

...g, R. at 4460-61.
On November 17, 1989, MLL wrote (Ex. P-39) to Anthony d i . c

threatening suit,
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to provide an attornment clause13, give further consent to the Boyer Co. sublease, and give
other concessions, as set forth in an attached "Second Amendment to Ground Lease," which
quoted virtually verbatim the provisions requested by Boyer's lawyer in his March 14, 1989
letter. When Anthony's lawyer asked for a copy of the proposed sublease and Development
Agreement to consider approving the sublease (Ex. D-31), MLL by letter of December 8,
1989 (Ex. P-42) refused to provide it unless the Middletons first agreed not to ask for more
rent and not to sue, and said that even if the Middletons so agreed, "the rental provisions
[in the sublease] will be masked," these being the very provisions to which Boyer's lawyer
objected saying they created the risk of breach of the Amended Lease. Ex. P-42. MLL kept
Boyer's lawyer's objections secret, too.
Simultaneously, on November 17, 1989, MLL wrote Boyer Co. threatening suit if it
did not sign the proposed sublease in 10 days and stating that Anthony's "threats of
litigation" were unfounded. Ex. P-40. Boyer Co. twice declined to sign, first writing on
November 22, 1989 that "The Boyer Company does not view the threats made by Tony
Middleton as 'without basis in law or fact...'" and that the Boyer Co. was not bound to sign
the sublease. Ex. D-30

Boyer Co.'s lawyer then wrote on February 5, 1990 again that

Boyer Co. was not bound to sign the sublease because the Development Agreement had
expired a year before and that Boyer Co. was terminating negotiations because "Medical
Leasing has been unable to obtain the necessary cooperation of the landowner to make the
ground lease financeable." Ex. D-39.

13

That is, that the Middletons would perform MLL's obligations to Boyer under the sublease if MLL
defaulted on the Amended Ground Lease.
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Throughout all this, the only attempt of MLL to communicate with the other
Middletons was by MLL's counsel, John Parsons, rv ,ciu

,, ^

x

N

^ • 1- i -

41), snii W rnm'.ir m ul lo Dr. Richard P. Middleton, which merely transmitted a copy of
Mr. Parson's previous November 17, 1989 letter i Lx. l'-/>, u; Anthony and asked thai it I t
sail I',i ,ill Mitlillrlimj
At a meeting on February 1 \ ; W MI J '> Dr Ring continued to ask Boyt i
would not !\

. i;

% ..ions had accepted instead oi the

attornment clause and other provisions Boyer's lawyer wanted, but Boyer still did not agree
to go forward. Lx. LK\S, p. „\ 8.
The Amended Lease specifically provides that a party is not in default until 30 days
after written notice specifying how a party has failed lo peilmni and those particulars remain
., ,

( riod (Ex. P-3, f 8, p. 6-7). It requires notice to the landlord be given by

certified mail addressed to the person to whom rent is payable, wih,; s
Mitidlcloii,

h\

P-o "l I "' |

il)

No such notice was given to Anthony, iu Richard P.

Middleton, noi to counsel for these Middletons, Moyle & Draper, with whom, pi ioi
negotiations :;J. n \

* ••••

ei mention any complaint about

Anthony to R <}, = k. at 4909), even through they continued to work daily in the same
hospital, D

ong often attending as anesthesiology! in \i (i

Neither the Middletons :ior Hiu:
demands. On February 16 1C)(:: . .

,

surgeries. R. at 4908.

Co. acceded to MLL's November 17. 1°S9
Ihis aciion

R, A\

1

Mir original Complaint

had five claims. Count 1 prayed for a declaratory judgment and injunction requiring the
Middletons to consent and agree to the terms demanded in \II I \ Nouantvi 1 ' i ()>,|J| "r-Mrr
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to Anthony. Count II was a claim for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing in the Amended Lease. Count III was for intentional interference with MLL's
Development Agreement with Boyer Co. Count IV was for intentional interference with
prospective economic relations, and Count V was for attorney's fees under the Amended
Lease. All of the claims were asserted against the other Middletons on the basis that
Anthony's acts were as agent of the other Middletons; no claim of joint and several liability
was made. Complaint, R. at 2-26.
Upon defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the trial court dismissed Count I, finding the
Middletons had no contractual obligation to consent to attornment or to the proposed Boyer
sublease. R. 301-2. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (R. 319) which included the
original claims except those for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The claims again
asserted the other Middletons were liable because Anthony acted as their agent; no claim
of joint and several liability was made, nor were any facts pleaded to support such a claim.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. R. at 447, 584. The court granted
summary judgment against plaintiff only on its second claim, for intentional interference with
the Development Agreement. The court held as a matter of law that there was no contract
between Boyer Co. and MLL which could be the subject of an interference claim. R. at
1078. The case proceeded to trial on the remaining claims.
At trial, Roger Boyer testified that financing was necessary if the project were to go
forward (Boyer, R. at 4874); that the items identified by his counsel in the March 14, 1989
letter (Ex. P-36, D-14) would be necessary to obtain financing (R. at 4876-77); that MLL's
attorney never changed Boyer's mind about whether those items "would have to be
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addressed . . . to get financing" (R. at 4877); and that he had no recollection of Anthony
threatening to sue him. or Boyer Co. at the meetings where Anthony was presenl. linym,
K 11 IS"" fliv" (in Inci. Boyer's project manager, similarly testified that financing was
required, that at meetings with MLL, Boyer Co. and Anthony, that Gardner said in obtain
financing Bo\ci ( a

need* J llu

requested financing items and an agreement from

Middletons (R. at 4821-22), and that he die , : recall \nthony making any threats to sue
Boyer Co. nor Boyer ever :.. :-;j"i-,. «

>
. to sue. K. ai 4808. Boyer

also testified that he agreed with his attorneys' letter of November 22, 1989 (Ex. I)-30)
(which included: "The Boyer Company does not view tin' fIm

JI

III.UK

U

I'I m\

Middleton

us 'without basis in law or fact . . .',") and his letter of February 5, 1990 (Ex. D-39)(calling
off negotiations for a sublease because "Unfortunately, Medical Leasing has heen unable to
obtain nil' iuressnr\ cooperation of the landowner in order to make the ground lease
financeable.") Boyer, R. at 4880-81.
'luvloi U'sliHe.l that even aftei the letter of MLL's counsel of April 10, 1989 (Ex. D15), he (Taylor) continued in his view about the necessity for the items in his March 1I, 1989
letter (Ex. w-. t'> and continued to iu\e concerns whetbci MI.I, was independent of Boyer
when MLL could receive rents based on rents received by Boyer. R. at 5442-44, 5448-49.
The evidence aaai Bover 1 o. did not proceed wnfh the |uo|tvi because MLL did not
provide a ground lease in form suitable to Boyer was uncontradicted. While Boyer was
concerned about litigation, including MLL's threats, there is in i v\ nlence in ilu uroiu mat
Boyer ilid not proceed because of any threats by Anthony; indeed Roger Boyer testified he
did not remember any threats from Anthony. R, at 4877.
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At the conclusion of the trial, before the jury was instructed, the trial court ruled that
neither the Amended Lease nor the law required MLL to give Middletons written notice and
30 day cure right as a condition precedent to a claim for default under the contract. R. at
5889-90.
Defendants objected to various jury instructions given by the Court, including
submission of any issue of breach of express contract or implied covenant of good faith. R.
at 5914-15.
The jury returned a verdict, finding:
a.

Anthony and Carol14 Middleton tortiously and intentionally interfered with

MLL's prospective economic relations but the other defendants did not (Answer to
Interrogatory No. 1, R. at 1569); and
b.

Anthony and Carol Middleton breached "the express terms of the Amended

Ground Lease and/or their implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" but the other
defendants did not. Answer to Interrogatory No. 4, R. at 1572.
The jury found $2,582,780 compensatory damages (R. at 1574), derived from MLL's
CPA's calculations of the present value of all of the lease payments to be made by Boyer
Co. to MLL under the proposed sublease for its full term through 2055 as though the Boyer
sublease were signed and in effect.
The jury found the other Middletons did not tortiously interfere with plaintiffs
prospective economic relations (R. at 1569-70), and did not breach the lease or any covenant

14

There is no claim that Carol had any communications with Boyer Co. or MLL. She testified that
Anthony represents her regarding the property. R. at 5034. The jury found against Carol only on the basis
that Anthony was her agent.
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of good faith (R. at 1572-73). Hence, the jury found MLL knew Anthony was not an agent
for these Middletons defendants as to the Boyer di\rMi

v .•:..

••

M iddctons
M

did not ratify Anthony's acts. The Court's Instruction No. 25 : *id i,V jury

. . . The

Middletons claim that Anthony Middleton was not the agent of any i
had 1'Mi*cii 1 old ,tin I knew thai Anthony Middleton was not the agent of any member of the
Group." R. at 1:43.

\11 defendants except Anthony's wife, Cami, prevailea

and time was suhstaiilial nidi iii a Li Siippoil ilia |iiiVs finding. See, i.e., R. ui 4910-13,
5005.
. MLL's application for attorneys' fees ai id costs (R at 1 752) included time spent on
claims which were asserted in the original, dismissed complaint, and for which attorneys' fees
are not awardable. I he application also included $25,01111 I'm cxfienscs tm Ml J, s damages
expert. Middletons filed objections to MLL's application for fees, R. at 2305 and 2329.
After trial, the trial court held, as a matter of law: (a) Mine w.t.s sahstandal evidence
that paragraph x of the Amended Ground Lease was expressly breached by Anthony (R. at
2944,1. 9-13); (b) that all Middletons were jointly liable for the breach
.

a ^ :^JH)ii .

< . .

leys' fees (R. at 2941-42).15

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
NOTU'i

Hi"1 dofau'll piovn-aa pa i atii aph u of the Amended Lease, requires notice

and an opportunity to cure before a party may be "deemed to be in default."

u

ucn notice

is a condition precedent to die rnnmit'iNvmenl MI an .irhmi under the Lease. MLL iu};ed
to give the required notice.
15

Middletons, Stipulation as to the amount of the $275,000 allowance reserved their right to contest MLL's
claim for attorneys' fees and to contest the award of fees and/or the amount of fees for MLL's failure to
"allocate time and fees for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2)
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees." R. at 2951.
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TENANTS-IN-COMMON: MLL had actual knowledge that Anthony Middleton was
not the agent for these Middletons and that any actual or apparent authority was withdrawn.
The other Middletons (except Carol) are not liable for Anthony Middleton's acts.
Common law rules establish: where the lessors are tenants-in-common, the lease
operates as separate leases of each undivided interest. Consequently, the Middletons are
not jointly liable for Anthony's acts. Tenants in common are not agents for each other. The
jury found that Anthony Middleton was not the agent for these Middletons. The trial court
erred in finding, as a matter of law, joint liability among all Middletons.
If Middletons are jointly bound, Anthony's actions, independent of and unauthorized
by these Middletons were ineffective because all tenants-in-common must join as plaintiffs
in any legal action against their tenant.
The rules of contract interpretation establish the Middletons did not promise the
same performance and thus are not jointly liable. At the very least, the Amended Lease is
ambiguous as to whether the parties intended Middletons would be jointly liable. Extrinsic
evidence should have been submitted to the jury, as the trier of fact, to resolve the
ambiguity.
MLL failed to plead joint liability in its Amended Complaint. MLL did not seek to
amend the Complaint to add a joint liability claim. Except for Carol Middleton, the jury
found against MLL on the claim it asserted, agency.
BREACH OF LEASE AND COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH: Paragraph 8 of the
Amended Lease does not contain any express obligation. Middletons did not breach the
express terms of paragraph 8 of the Amended Lease. The covenant of good faith and fair
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dealing was not breached by Middletons. Even Anthony's actions were consistent with the
parties' expectations. The covenaiii wl umul faith and l.ui baling does not create a joint
obligation; only Anthony is liable for its breach.
ATTORNEYS' FEES: I \w \vu\i court erred in awarding attorne) s' fees becai ise tl le
Middletnns were not "a defaulting party" absent written notice and opportunity to cure, and
because the jury did not find breach of the express covenants

-M-

:>;

( ii \\ hii In lrr\ w ere ;n\"in)ed did not distinguish between the tu;t uaim, jihe 4 losing claims
and the contract claim; since fees cannot be awarded for the tort claim and losing claims,
the entire fee

.. fails.

If the judgment is reversed, Middletons may be the prevailing party and entitled to
fees under the Amended Lca.v

•

njM' should he lemanded with direction to the trial

court to determine whether Middletons are entitled to attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
I.

A.

MEDICAL LEASING FAILED TO GIVE MIDDLETONS THE
NOTICE REQUIRED BY THE AMENDED GROUND LEASE AND
BY LAW; SUCH NOTICE IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ANY
SIJIT.

Medical Leasing Failed to Give Middletons the Notice Required by the Amended
Ground Lease.
MI 1 did i lot give tl le i intici i and cure opportunity required by paragraph 6 of the

Amended Lease (Ex. P-3). It reads:
6.
Default. A party shall be deemed to be in default upon the expiration
of thirty (30) days from the date of written notice from the other party specifying the
particulars in which such party has failed to perform the obligations of this lease
unless that party, prior to expiration of said thirty (30) days, has rectified the
particulars specified in the notice. Upon such default occurring, the non-defaulting
party may incur any expenses necessary to perform the obligation of the other party
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as specified in such notice, and if the defaulting party is the Landlord, Tenant may
deduct such expenses from the rents thereafter to become due. If the defaulting
party is the Tenant, Landlord may decree the term ended and enter the Leased
Premises with or without process of law. The remedies in this article conferred do
not exclude any other remedies provided in the Lease or by law.
For Middletons to be in default, MLL was required by the contract to give
Middletons written notice "specifying the particulars in which such party has failed to
perform the obligations of this lease . . . " The party to whom the notice is directed will be
"deemed to be in default" only if the alleged defects are not cured within the 30-day period.
Paragraph 12 of the Lease provides in applicable part:
12. Notices. Any notice provided for herein shall be given by registered or
certified United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed, if to Landlord, to the person
to whom the rent is then payable at the address to which the rent is then mailed, and,
if to Tenant to Salt Lake Surgical Center, Inc., 617 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
Paragraph 13 of the Amended Ground Lease states:
13. Where Rent Payable. Until further notice in writing, rent shall b[e] paid
to Richard P. Middleton, 1437 Harvard Avenue, Salt lake City, Utah.
MLL does not claim it gave notice. R. at 2412-13. It argues that because of the last
sentence of paragraph 6, written notice of default is required only "before the non-defaulting
party may incur expenses necessary to perform the obligation of the other party. . . . " R.
at 2413. That is contrary to oft-stated principles of contract interpretation. See Jones v.
Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980) rejecting the argument that one paragraph negated
another and holding:

"It is axiomatic that a contract should be interpreted so as to

harmonize all of its provisions." Id. at 735 (citation omitted).
The last sentence of paragraph 6 does not affect the absolute obligation of giving
notice and right to cure before claiming default. The last sentence deals only with "remedies
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in this article"; remedies are mentioned only in the middle two sentences of the article, but
remedies are not mentioned in the first sentence; ergo, the last sentence does not modify
the first. The middle two sentences deal with two remedies of many available at law: on
the Landlord's default, the Tenant may deduct from rent the expense of performing the
Landlord's obligation; or, on the Tenant's default, the Landlord may decree the term ended.
The last sentence merely provides that other remedies, in addition to those stated in the
middle two sentences, are not excluded. The last sentence in no way negates the obligation
in the first sentence to give notice to a party and the 30-day cure right.
Indeed, MLL agreed with this analysis before trial when it moved to exclude evidence
of these Middletons' attorneys' fees for lack of notice. R. at 1225. MLL said:
[PJaragraph 16 only provides for the collection of attorneys' fees against a "defaulting
party" and pursuant to the terms of the Amended Ground Lease a party is only in
default if given written notice and thirty days upon which to correct any defaults.
. . . In this case, [MLL] never received written notice of any default of thirty days
upon which to cure any alleged default from [Middletons]. [See Affidavit of Wallace
Ring attached hereto.] Therefore, pursuant to the terms of paragraph 6 of the
Amended Ground lease, [MLL] cannot be 'deemed to be in default' under the terms
of the Amended Ground lease . . .
Middletons assume MLL's counsel was in good faith in advancing that argument in its
memorandum16.

Not only is this interpretation by MLL reasonable, it is the only

interpretation which allows all provisions of the article to be given effect.
Bentlev v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 620 (Utah 1984) held:
When a lease provides that if a party to the lease is in default then the other
party may terminate the lease after giving notice of the default, the notice must
plainly indicate the nature of the default or breach and give reasonable notice that
failure to cure the default within the time allowed may lead to termination.
Hadlock v. Showcase Real Estate, Inc.. 680 P.2d 395, 398 (Utah 1984) held:

16

MLL forgot that these Middletons did give notice of default at their first opportunity, in the Second
Cause of Action of their Counterclaim claiming fees for defense. R. at 424.
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[U]ntil an appropriate notice and demand has been given him in accordance with
paragraph 16A [of the uniform real estate contract], the plaintiffs, as sellers, have no
cause of action under that instrument to terminate his interest. See First Security
Bank of Utah v. Maxwell 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983).
MLL failed to give Middletons the proper notice and opportunity to cure. Therefore,
Middletons were not in default under the Amended Lease, and therefore the claim for
breach of the Lease should have been dismissed as a matter of law.
B.

Notice is Required by Law.
Even if the Amended Lease did not require notice, notice is required by law. Section

7.1 of the Restatement (Second) of Property provides remedies for a tenant for the
landlord's failure to perform a valid promise contained in the lease where the tenant is
deprived of a significant inducement to the making of the lease "if the landlord does not
perform his promise within a reasonable period of time after being requested to do so."
(Emphasis added.) Comment d to this section amplifies the requirement of notice:
d. Requirement of request to landlord to perform promise and allowance of
reasonable time to comply. The tenant may hold the landlord in default, under the
rule of this section, for the landlord's failure to perform a promise contained in the
lease only if the tenant has requested the landlord to perform and given him a
reasonable time to do so.
(Emphasis in text.)

Comment d illustrates the notice requirement:

landlord, having

promised tenant that landlord will not permit use of his other property for food sales, leases
property adjacent to tenant to another, exacting a promise that no food will be sold there.
Notwithstanding, the second tenant sells food. Two months later, the first tenant notifies
landlord of termination of the lease because of the competing food sales. The illustration
indicates that the tenant's notice is not sufficient because the landlord "has not been given
a reasonable time to force the second tenant to comply with the terms of his lease."
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That illustration applies to the situation in this case. Had MLL given the Middletons
proper notice claiming default under the Amended Lease, Middletons (and not just
Anthony) would have known MLL believed the Middletons collectively should act. They
would have had opportunity to consider what action to take, which might have included: (a)
in terms of the illustration to comment d, "to force [Anthony Middleton] to comply with the
terms of his lease"; (b) to advise MLL and/or Boyer Co. that Middletons would not sue if
there were no violation of the Amended Lease;17 or (c) to remind plaintiff and/or Boyer that
Anthony had no legal basis to act without the involvement of the others Middletons, though
such reminder was legally unnecessary because MLL and Boyer were bound to know that.
See Point II, infra.
Instead of giving the Middletons such notice of default under the Amended Lease and
opportunity to act, MLL, by letter of November 17, 1989 (Ex. P-39), addressed only to
Anthony, demanded, among other things, that all the Middletons consent to the Boyer
sublease and sign amendments to the Amended Lease agreeing to attornment and other
matters. The trial court ruled, properly, that the Middletons were not required to do so.
The irony of this case is that had the Middletons acceded to what they were not required
to do, and for which they were sued in the first count of the first Complaint, they would have
avoided this judgment of over three million dollars!
The notice provision takes on greater significance when MLL claims joint liability,
that is, that all Middletons are liable for Anthony's acts because they signed as "Landlord."

17

That is in essence what R.G. Middleton told Anthony when they discussed possible suit:
A.
opposed to
Q.
A.
at 5009]

I am sure. He asked me if I thought we should consider a lawsuit, and I was generally
that.
And why were you opposed to it?
I didn't have enough information, and I didn't think we had any basis for such a suit. [R.

MLL seeks to hold all Middletons for the acts of Anthony, without notice, even though it
knew Anthony did not have authority to act.
The Amended Lease's notice requirements must be met before the claim of the
breach of covenant of good faith can be asserted. The parties' expression in the contract
cannot be abrogated or changed by an implied covenant. Ted R. Brown & Associates v.
Carnes, 753 P.2d 964 (Utah 1988).
Because MLL failed to give notice of the claimed default, Middletons cannot be
"deemed to be in default." The judgment should be reversed.
II-

MEDICAL LEASING KNEW THAT ANTHONY MIDDLETON WAS
NOT AUTHORIZED TO ACT FOR THESE MIDDLETONS;
ANTHONY MIDDLETON'S ACTS CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO
THESE MIDDLETONS ON ANY THEORY.

These Middletons are not responsible for Anthony's breach of contract in connection
with the MLL-Boyer negotiations because MLL was specifically on notice that Anthony did
not have the authority to represent these Middletons in matters concerning Boyer's proposed
development. In finding Anthony was not the agent of the other Middletons (except Carol),
the jury found that MLL knew Anthony did not speak for the other Middletons. See Jury
Instruction 25, R. at 1543; Dr. Wong, R. at 4908-4911. Even where joint liability is
presumed, advanced notice to a third party that he or she will not be bound by the acts of
another eliminates the third party's ability to assert joint liability.
For example, a third person is on notice that an agent's authority is revoked "when
the principal states such fact to the third person." Restatement of Agency (Second) §
136(a). See, Alano Club 12, Inc. v. Hibbs, 150 Ariz. 428, 742 P.2d 47, 52 (1986): ("The
apparent authority that might otherwise exist vanishes if the third party gains knowledge of
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the agent's lack of authority.") Also: "Every partner is an agent of the partnership . . . unless
. . . the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such
authority." U.C.A. § 48-1-6(1).
In First National Bank & Trust Co. of Williston v. Scherr, 467 N.W.2d 427 (N.D.
1991), a bank attempted to recover on a note executed by one of two partners, though it was
on notice that both partners' signatures were required to bind the partnership. The court
held:
A partner, as an agent of the partnership, normally binds the partnership by
executing any instrument that carries on the business of the partnership in the usual
way. [citation omitted]. But, as with any agent, that is not so if the partner's authority
is restricted, and if the restriction is known to the person with whom the partner
deals, [citation omitted].
Id. at 429.18 The court noted:
Many decisions by other courts have ruled that a person cannot recover from
a second partner or the partnership for additional transactions with an acting partner
after that person had notice of a later restriction on the acting partner's authority.19
This principle also applies to tenants-in-common. In Wilkinsburg Real Estate &
Trust Co. v. Lewis. 173 Pa.Super. 372, 98 A.2d 746, 748 (1953), the court held:
Hopper knew that his co-tenant [in common] Lewis had engaged the services of the
plaintiff to find a tenant for the joint property and that the plaintiff was making
efforts to procure such tenant. Being aware of these facts, Hopper, if he did not wish
plaintiff to represent him, had the duty to make that fact known to plaintiff.
Joint liability is not an immutable, absolute implication; it can be limited, just as
partner's or agent's authority to deal on a future situation can be limited.

Whenever

individuals enter a business relationship, whether it be as partners, principal and agent,
18

The court in Scherr interprets the North Dakota Uniform Partnership Act, NDCC 45-06-01 (1) and (4),
which is identical to Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6 (1) and (4).
19

The court cites eleven cases, the most recent being: Arrington v. Columbia Nitrogen Corp., 168
Ga.App. 455, 309 S.E.2d 428 (1983); Owens v. Palos Verdes Monaco, 142 Cal.App.3d 855, 191 Cal.Rptr. 381
(1983).
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tenants-in-common or any other form, limits on their liability are recognized if third parties
have notice of authority limitations.
In this case, there was no doubt MLL knew Anthony did not represent these
Middletons in dealing with MLL and Boyer Co. on the proposed development. Dr. Wong
acknowledged that R.G. Middleton so told him before Boyer's first meeting with Anthony
in August of 1989 and the jury so found. These Middletons are not jointly liable to MLL
for Anthony's acts.
III.

IF MIDDLETONS ARE JOINTLY BOUND, A THREAT OF
LITIGATION
BY ONE TENANT-IN-COMMON
CANNOT
CONSTITUTE BREACH OF LEASE, AS ALL TENANTS-INCOMMON MUST JOIN AS PLAINTIFFS IN ANY LEGAL ACTION,

If the Middletons are jointly liable as MLL claims, each would be required to join in
any action against their tenant:
[I]n actions . . . against lessees to recover rent, joinder of all cotenants as plaintiffs
is usually required... . [Individual tenants in common may file separate actions for
recovery of proportionate shares of rent if the cotenants have not bound themselves
jointly in the lease.
R. Powell & P. Rohan, Law of Real Property ("Powell"), 1 606[1] (1991), p. 50-34 to 36,
footnotes omitted.
No one would claim Anthony had unilateral power to extend the lease term or to
lower the rent. If the Middletons were jointly bound by the Amended Lease, Anthony had
no power to make good on any threat of suit for more rent without participation of the
other Middletons in the suit, just as he could not alone extend the term of the lease or lower
the rent. See Mavo v. Jones, 505 P.2d 157 (Wash. App. 1972). If the Middletons are jointly
bound, as MLL has argued, then Anthony's separate, unauthorized, unratified threat to sue,
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as a matter of law, cannot constitute a breach of contract because an action or suit by
Anthony alone, without the other Middletons, could not stand as an act of ,,Landlord,, under
the Lease.
In Mast v. Passman, 70 P.2d 271 (Cal. 1937), a tenant in common who, as lessor, gave
notice to the tenant of a rent increase was determined to have increased the rent only as to
her one-half interest, since she could not bind or act for the other cotenants.
MLL cannot have it both ways: if Middletons are jointly bound under the Amended
Lease, MLL had no right to consider the act of one as the act of all. Thus, MLL was bound,
as a matter of law, to consider Anthony's alleged threat as his own independent,
unenforceable position. Had MLL given it any real credence, MLL would have given the
rest of the Middleton family notice of Anthony's "threats" and asked if that were the position
of all the Middletons, as MLL was bound to do from its knowledge that Anthony did not
represent the rest of the Middletons. See Points I and II, supra.
IV.

AS TENANTS-IN-COMMON, THE LEASE BY MIDDLETONS IS
REGARDED BY LAW AS SEPARATE LEASES OF THEIR
SEPARATE INTERESTS; MIDDLETONS ARE NOT JOINTLY
LIABLE FOR THE UNAUTHORIZED, UNRATIFIED ACTS OF
ANOTHER TENANT-IN-COMMON; AS A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT, MIDDLETONS DID NOT
PROMISE THE SAME PERFORMANCE, OR THE AMBIGUOUS
PROVISIONS OF THE LEASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED
TO THE JURY.

Tenancy-in-common is derived from the English common law, Powell, t 602[1], is
specifically recognized by statute, § 57-1-5, Utah Code, and is the preferred form of
ownership of real property among two or more persons. Id.; Powell, f 602[2].
As tenants-in-common, each Middleton owns an undivided fractional part of the
property, none owning the whole as in joint tenancy. Each tenant-in-common could transfer
only his or her undivided fractional part or any portion thereof, by deed or by will without
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affecting the other tenants-in-common and each may so transfer without the others'
permission. See, Smith and Boyer, Survey of the Law of Property, p. 63 (2nd Ed. 1971).
A.

The Common Law Rule is That As Tenants-In-Common, Each Middleton Made a
Separate Lease with Medical Leasing.
A lease of land by two or more tenants-in-common is not regarded as one lease by

all of them, but as several leases by the tenants in common of their undivided separate and
respective shares. 1 E. Washburn, The American Law of Real Property, ch XIII § 3 (1887);
C. Tiedemann, The American Law of Real Property, § 178 (1906). A. Freeman, Cotenancy
and Partition, § 220 (2nd. ed. 1886) states the rule: If, however, the lessors be coparceners
or tenants in common, the lease operates as the separate demise of each, and must be so
treated.
Based upon this long-standing legal principle, by leasing his/her own interest, no
Middleton promised a lease of the whole or that the others would lease their interests.
"[T]he act of a single cotenant will bind only his fractional share." Powell, if 606[3], p. 50-37;
Swanson v. Swanson, 250 P.2d 40 (Okla. 1951); Milkes v. Smith, 204 P.2d 419 (Cal. 1949).
First v. Byrne, 28 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 1947) holds: In a joint mortgage given by cotenants each pledges his own undivided interest. Separate liens are created upon the
separate interests. If the interest of one is mortgaged to secure the individual debt of the
other, a relationship of suretyship is created.

Consequently, as a matter of law, the

underlying form of ownership dictates that the promise of each of the Middletons in the
Amended Lease was a promise of his or her separate and individual performance and not
a promise to be surety for the others. Had the parties intended a co-surety provision, that
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each would be liable for the others' acts, they would have said so in the document, with the
words "jointly and severally" but those words are not to be found in the Amended Lease.
B.

The Common Law Rule Is That One Tenant-In-Common Is Not Liable For the Acts
of Other Tenants-In-Common.
The very idea that one cotenant is liable for the act of another cotenant is repugnant

to the doctrine underlying tenancy in common.

As stated in the leading treatise on

cotenancy, an admission, action or representation of one cotenant
can create no estoppel, nor furnish a basis of any claim against the other cotenants
in common. The objection to binding one by the representations of another is, that
this cannot be done without doing an injury to him who has not participated in the
representations, and making him responsible for the default of one over whom he can
exercise no control.
A. Freeman, Cotenancy and Partition, § § 169 & 170 (2nd ed. 1886).
Tenants-in-common may transfer their interests without consent of others, (Powell
at 1 602[9], p. 50-13), unlike a partnership. One tenant-in-common "cannot convey away or
alienate the interest of another cotenant unless he is clearly and properly authorized so to
do"; Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978). Tenants-in-common by virtue of
that relationship, cannot bind the others. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986);
Rocky Mountain Stud Farm Co. v. Lunt, 151 P.2d 521 (Utah 1915). That is so because new
persons can be brought into the tenancy-in-common without consent of the others, unlike
a partnership. Unquestionably, no tenant-in-common contemplates being liable for the
unauthorized acts of other, unknown persons, who might later become tenants-in-common
through deed or will of a cotenant.20 The policy of the law is not to hold a tenant-incommon liable for the unauthorized acts of another tenant-in-common.

20

"Without consent of cotenants, a tenant in common may sell or encumber his interest, and thus inject
a stranger into the cotenancy." Powell, 1 606[4], 50-38.
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C

The Common-Law Rule Should Be Retained: Tenants-In-Common Make Separate
Leases of Their Separate Interests.
At the end of the trial, MLL asserted Middletons were all liable based upon joint

liability. See Points VI, infra. In post-trial briefing, MLL relied on Section 289(1) of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
Where two or more parties to a contract promise the same performance to
the same promisee, each is bound for the whole performance thereof, whether his
duty is joint, several, or joint and several.
MLL's position demands that common law principles regarding tenancy-in-common be
abandoned in favor of this contract principle.
If the common-law principle applies, only those tenants-in-common who, as lessor,
breach their lease with the tenant will be liable; the non-acting or non-breaching tenants-incommon will not be liable for the cotenant's breach. If MLL's claimed contract principles
apply, the lease must be construed to determine whether the tenants-in-common made the
same promise.21 See Part D to this Point IV, infra.
The landlord-tenant relationship is a combination of property and contract principles,
which has undergone gradual change over the centuries and is continuing today. Powell, 1
221[2] at 16-11. Powell cautions:
While the trend of current cases is towards application of contract rules,. . .
Contract rules, however, are not always the panacea for lease problems that they may
initially seem to be, nor are property rules always regressive in lease cases. As the
work of reforming landlord-tenant law continues, it is useful for all interested parties
to remember that neither property nor contract principles (nor any other rules) are
ends in themselves, but only means to the efficient and just ordering of the landlordtenant relationship in a complex society.
Id. (Emphasis added, footnote omitted.)

21

This analysis is independent of the analysis in Point V, to the effect that no express promise was
breached at all by Anthony Middleton.
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This Court has been very cautious in adopting a contract approach over a common
law rule. In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989), the "traditional
rule" (that a landlord is not required to mitigate by reletting when the tenant abandons the
premises) was rejected in favor of the "trend rule" (that a landlord is required to take steps
to mitigate its losses).
The common-law rule of non-liability for torts of another tenant-in-common22 should
not be discarded in favor of the contract approach for a number of reasons. First, tenancyin-common is recognized and preferred as a form of ownership by two or more persons by
statute.

§ 57-1-5, Utah Code Ann.

The legislature has specifically recognized the

importance of this form of property ownership.
Second, the common law of England has been adopted so far as "it is consistent with
and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the
people hereof and it "shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state." § 68-3-1, Utah
Code.23
Third, the common law rule allows recourse against the breaching tenant-in-common
without punishing the innocent, non-acting tenant-in-common.
Fourth, the common law is appropriate to this special, unique form of ownership.
For example, as tenants-in-common, no Middleton was able to give the same performance;
none could convey exclusive possession of the whole property; each could only convey his
or her undivided interest in the whole. Carr v. Peking, 765 P.2d 40 (Wash. 1988). While a

22

Simpson v Seavev, 8 Me 138 (1831); Marsh v. Hand, 24 NE 463 (N.Y. 1890).

23

Several cases have recognized the adoption of the common law in this state. See, for example, State in
Interest of R.R. & C.R., 797 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1990) ("the common law doctrine of emancipation is, by
virtue of section 68-3-1, a part of the law of this jurisdiction constituting the rule of decision in Utah courts
. . .").
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cotenant may lawfully lease his own interest in common property without the consent of
another cotenant, the non-consenting cotenant is not bound by the terms of the lease and
can demand to be let into co-possession.
Policy considerations require that the common law rules be retained. This Court
should reverse the trial court and hold that each Middleton, as a tenant-in-common, entered
into a separate lease with MLL.24 The jury having found no agency between Anthony and
all other Middletons (except Carol), only Anthony and Carol can be liable if there was a
breach of the lease or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
D.

Rejection of the Common-Law Rules Will Require Interpretation of the Lease Under
Principles of Contract Interpretation.
If this Court determines the common law rule (that tenants-in-common as lessors

enter into a lease separately) should be rejected in favor of contract principles, the Amended
Lease must be analyzed based on principles of contract interpretation to determine the
intent of the parties or if there is any ambiguity in its terms.
The key issue in the analysis of the Amended Lease based on principles of contract
interpretation is whether the Middletons promised the same performance. Whether the
same performance or separate performances are promised is to be determined by "the
manifested intention of the parties." Section 288 of the Restatement of Contracts (Second),
states:
(1) Where two or more parties to a contract make a promise or promises to
the same promisee, the manifested intention of the parties determines whether they
promised that the same performance or separate performances shall be given.
[Emphasis added.25]
24

This is so even though the Amended Lease calls for rent payments to be paid to Dr. R. P. Middleton;
undoubtedly Middletons and MLL agreed to that arrangement for their mutual convenience.
25

The comment to the Restatement provision concerning "same performance" is helpful in understanding
the concepts involved. Comment a. addresses the issue of what constitutes the same performance.
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Section 2 of the Restatement defines or interprets "manifestation of intention" as "the
external expression of the intention as distinguished from undisclosed intention. . . ." See,
also, Comments to § 20 of the Restatement.
The proper approach to contract interpretation is to consider: first, if the meaning
of the words can be determined from the contract itself and the circumstances of the parties
at the time the contract was entered into, Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657
P.2d 743 (Utah 1982);26 second, if an ambiguity exists, by extrinsic evidence, including
negotiations, Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981)27; and third, the
interpretation given by the parties through their course of dealing or conduct after the
contract, Zeese v. Siegel's Estate, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975).
E.

Words of the Amended Lease Establish that Middletons Are Not Jointly Bound,
The court must first consider the words and lack of words of the contract in light of

the circumstances of the parties at the time of the contract. Utah State Medical Ass'n,
supra.
It is clear from the Lease that the promises it contains were made severally rather
than joint:
Ordinarily, a promise by two or more in the singular number is prima facie several,
while a promise in the plural is prima facie joint.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bismark Invest. Corp., 547 P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1976). The
Lease uses the term "Landlord." The use of the word "Landlord" in the Lease is in the

26

See also: Larrabee v. Roval Dairy Products Co., 614 P.2d 160 (Utah 1980), Utah State Medical Ass'n
v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982) ("In interpreting the terms of the contract,
the Court must look to the contract as a whole, to the circumstances, nature and purpose of the contract.").
27

See, subsection (2) of § 212 of the Restatement, fn. 3. Comment b. to § 212 for discussion of the use
and role of extrinsic evidence.
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singular, constituting prima facie an intention by each Middleton of a separate or several
promise.
No words of joint promise are found in the lease, only words of separate undertaking.
According to the court in Lithia Lumber Company v. Lamb, 443 P.2d 647, 649 (Or. 1968):
The theory of joint and several liability, however, applies to contracts only when the
contracts themselves expressly or by implication, impose joint and several liability.
Separate, rather than joint obligations arise from a tenancy-in-common relationship.
F.

The Circumstances of the Parties At the Time Show That Joint Liability Was Not
Intended.
The court must look to the underlying circumstances of the parties in the analysis of

whether the obligation of promisors is joint or several. Utah State Medical Assn., supra.
In Lithia Lumber Company v. Lamb, supra, the plaintiff joined Drew and Zelma Lamb, a
corporation, and a partnership, as defendants. The Lambs "controlled the corporation and
were two of the partners in the partnership, but no argument was made that these entities
should be disregarded." There were three contracts, one of which was signed by all of the
defendants. The plaintiff asserted that all the contracts constituted one transaction. The
court concluded that
since the different defendants owned different parcels of timber their liabilities, if any,
were several.
. . . [T]he contracting parties are liable only severally, if at all, for the
nonperformance of any specific contractual duties which each party severally may
have undertaken to perform.
Id. at 649.
The Middletons are: tenants-in-common, in a divergent family, with a trust and a
remote widow (Delores in Washington, D.C.). These circumstances demonstrate an informal
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association among Middletons, as opposed to partnership or some other legal entity, and the
intent of making separate leases.
G.

If There Is Ambieuitv, Or If Extrinsic Evidence Is Required To Interpret The
Contract The Question Of Interpretation Is To Be Determined By The Trier Of Fact
At the very least, the Amended Lease is ambiguous as to whether the parties

intended Middletons' promises to be joint or several, necessitating consideration of extrinsic
evidence.27 CJ. Realty. Inc. v. Willey. 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1988)('This [an ambiguity]
requires the taking of evidence and the making of factual findings." 758 P.2d at 929). Any
ambiguity on the joint or several liability question was resolved in these Middletons' favor
by the jury when it found in favor of these Middletons on the breach of the express or
implied covenants questions. The jury found Anthony and Carol breached the Lease; it did
not find "Landlord" breached it. See Verdict, R. at 1569.
H.

Construction of Terms of the Contract by the Parties Also Establishes that
Middletons Are Not Jointly Bound,
If a contract is ambiguous, a court may consider the construction of the terms by the

parties, through their actions.

27

Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah

Section 212 of the Restatement provides that:
(2) A question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined by
the trier of fact if it depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among
reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence. Otherwise, a question of
interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined as a question of law.

(Emphasis added.) MLL's argument at best involves a choice of reasonable inferences; that is, did the parties
intend to follow traditional common law real property rules (tenants-in-common), or did the use of the word
"Landlord" infer that they intended separate promises or to discard those rules. Hence the issue is a question
of fact, and on that question of fact, the jury verdict found that these defendants did not breach the contract.
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1981)(M[T]he course of dealing of the parties gives some indication of their intentions.") 638
P.2d at 1195; Zeese v. Siegers Estate, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975).28
The parties' conduct demonstrates that MLL treated the various Middletons as having
different and distinct positions and that MLL recognized the promises of the Middletons to
be promises of their separate, distinct performance, not promises of the same performance.
Anthony, Carol, George and Jean Middleton had counsel separate from counsel for
the other Middletons in the Zions case and those groups took different positions before and
during that litigation.
It is undisputed that Dr. Wong, one of MLL's general partners, asked and R.G.
informed him, that Anthony did not represent these Middletons, and Dr. Wong raised no
objection thereto. The separateness of the Middletons' promises was further reflected in the
letters describing MLL's belief that "it [was] necessary that the entire Middleton family be
involved in any further dialogue" (Ex. 42). If the Middletons' obligations were joint, it was
not necessary to include the other Middletons "in any further dialogue" for MLL to have
recourse against all Middletons.
Turner v. Gunderson. 60 Wash. App. 696, 807 P.2d 370 (1991), held an obligee could
not escape such subsequent correspondence referring to separate promises. Here as well,
MLL's claim that the Middletons all promised the same performance is contradicted by its
own correspondence and performance.
In conclusion, the contract analysis points to the conclusion that joint liability was not
intended. If the Amended Lease was ambiguous, the finding of the jury should be sustained.

28

Zeese cites: Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 268, 501 P.2d 266 (1972); Bullouqh v.
Simons, 16 Utah 2d 304, 308, 400 P.2d 20 (1965); Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269, 275, 488 P.2d 302
(1971); Harding Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320 323, 266 P.2d 494 (1954).
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V.

A.

MIDDLETONS DID NOT BREACH PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE
LEASE, AS IT CREATES NO EXPRESS OBLIGATION; THE
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING WAS NOT
BREACHED AND IS IMPOSED UPON EACH PARTY TO A
CONTRACT BY LAW, NOT AS AN IMPLIED PROVISION OF THE
CONTRACT.

There Was No Breach Of The Express Provisions Of Paragraph 8 Of The Amended
Lease.
MLL claims the express terms of J 8 of the Amended Lease were breached.

Instruction No. 23 (R. at 1540) specifically identifies paragraph 8 as the provision which the
Middletons allegedly breached:
[Y]ou should find for Medical Leasing on its express breach of contract claim
if you find by a preponderance of the evidence each of the following elements:
(1) That a Defendant breached the express terms of paragraph 8 of
the Amended Ground Lease;
As amended by the Zions stipulation, paragraph 8 of the Amended Lease provides:
[Cjonsent of the Middletons to the future development of the leased premises
is not required unless the lessee shall seek to develop the property or an independent
third party sublessee or assignee requires that the interest of the Middletons be
subordinated to the interest of a development lender. In other words, the lessee may
not develop the property without the consent of the Middletons, but a third party
sublessee or assignee totally independent of the lessee may further develop the
property without the consent of the Middletons using its own or borrowed capital
provided subordination of the interest of the Middletons is not required for said
development.
This provision means consent of Middletons is not required if an independent third-party
developer does not ask the Middletons to subordinate; consent is required if MLL or
subordination is asked for. No action whatever is required by Middletons under paragraph
8, even as now restated in the Zions stipulation.
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MLL claimed Boyer Co. was an independent third party30 developer which could
develop the property without subordination, so no consent was required from Middletons.
Middletons did not, by the terms of paragraph 8, promise to do anything and they did not
promise not to do anything. They did not promise that, if approached and told by the
independent third party that their consent was required, they would not ask for more
rent. As a matter of law, none of the defendants breached an express provision of the
Amended Lease.
B.

The Covenant of Good Faith Was Not Breached,
Anthony explained on cross-examination that because Boyer told him his lawyer said

Middleton consent was required, that he believed Middletons would be requested to give
some concession or change the Amended Lease. He explained his understanding that if
subordination or changes in the Agreement were necessary to accommodate future
development, the Middletons could ask for more rent. The original language of the Lease
expressly left consent and subordination to Middletons' discretion. Dr. Wong testified of his
expectation, that if MLL asked for consent or changes, the Middletons would ask for more
rent. St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991)31 indicates
that "In [Utah], a coven .nt of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not all, contract
relationships." However, St. Benedicts's (811 P.2d at 200), explains:
To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's actions
must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations
of the other party.

30

Boyer's lawyer told Boyer these conditions did not exist and Boyer never changed his mind.

31

MLL's counsel here represented The Boyer Company there, in St. Benedicts.
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Anthony's conduct in threatening MLL with suit for more rent under these circumstances
was consistent with both parties' expectations that to get further consent or lease changes
more rent had to be paid; it was MLL who breached the implied covenant of good faith, not
only when it demanded the attornment and other changes without compensation, but in
suing for them and in continuing suit after the court correctly ruled Middletons were not
required to give the attornment changes. Indeed, the Zions case had addressed the identical
issue and the parties stipulated that Middleton's consent was not required if the
developer/sublessee were independent and no subordination was required. Similarly, Ted
R. Brown & Associates v. Carnes Corp, 753 P.2d 964, 970 (Utah 1988) holds:
Where a party's expectations under a contract are frustrated, he may seek recovery
from the other party only if his injury is the direct result of a breach of an agreed
term of the contract as modified. . . . an express agreement or covenant relating to
a specific contract right excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a different
or contradictory nature. . . . a court may not make a better contract for the parties
than they have made for themselves; furthermore, a court may not enforce asserted
rights not supported by the contract itself.
The parties expressed in the contract when consent is and is not needed. If it were not
needed by the contract MLL (and Boyer, knowing the contract) had no business approaching
Anthony on the subject, to make the specious "request for assurance of no suit," much less
to expect or demand consent and attornment. Having been wrongly approached and told
consent was necessary, Anthony was well within his rights to be suspicious and to threaten
suit in accordance with his and MLL's expectancy.
C.

The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Is Imposed on "Each Party"; It Does
Not Result In Joint Liability.
Corbin on Contracts explains the obligation of good faith:
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It is often said that an obligation of good faith is "implied" in every contract,
perhaps because a leading decision on good faith from New York uses this language,
see Kirke LaShalle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co, [198 N.E. 163, 263 N.Y. 79 (1933)].
While it is true that courts impose an obligation of good faith in every aspect of the
contractual relationship; under the terminology used in this treatise, the obligation of
good faith is "constructive" rather than "implied." That is because it is imposed by
law, either by statute (see U.CC. § 1-203) or the common law of the state (see
Subsec. (d) below). . . .
3A Corbin, § 654A, 1991 Pocket Part at 81.32
As stated in § 205 of the Restatement, the covenant is imposed upon each party.33
"Each party" is each Middleton, separately, and MLL. The jury found that only Anthony
breached the covenant of good faith.
To show a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an element of
subjective intent on the part of the breaching person must be shown. The jury specifically
found that no one other than Anthony and Carol were liable, so it cannot be said MLL
proved the others formed this intent and accordingly breached the contract. The other
Middletons cannot be held liable.
No case has been found which holds that breach of the covenant of good faith results
in liability to anyone other than the person who breaches the covenant. This Court has held
that breach of an implied covenant does not support a claim under an express covenant of
a contract, see Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976), discussed infra, so even if the
parties assumed joint liability under the express terms of the contract, it does not follow that
the joint liability flows into Anthony's breach of an constructive obligation. The trial court

32

Corbin aptly illustrates the limitation on the notion that the obligation of good faith is "implied". 3A
Corbin, § 654A, 1991 Pocket Part at 81.
33

"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
its enforcement." (Emphasis added). Restatement Second, Contracts, § 205.
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should be reversed as the jury found only Anthony and Carol breached the covenant of good
faith.
VI.

A.

MEDICAL LEASING'S CLAIM AND THEORY OF LIABILITY
AGAINST THESE DEFENDANTS WAS BASED SOLELY ON
AGENCY; MEDICAL LEASING DID NOT PLEAD JOINT
LIABILITY AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING
JUDGMENT AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS ON THE BASIS OF
JOINT LIABILITY.

Medical Leasing^ Pleaded and Tried Theory Against All Middletons Other Than
Anthony Middleton Was Based Solely on Agency.
MLL's Amended Complaint asserts liability on the part of all Middletons other than

Anthony solely on the basis of agency, including ratification. Amended Complaint 1 5, 3438; R. at 320-21, 329-30. The Amended Complaint contains no allegation of joint liability.
The only theory raised and litigated by MLL was agency. See MLL's Memorandum
in Opposition to Middleton's Motion for Summary Judgment dated April 23, 1991, (fn. 6 in
R. at 627); "Claims of the Parties" in the jury instructions, R. at 1530-31, similarly, and the
instruction on agency (R. at 1543).
B.

Medical Leasing Failed To Plead Joint Liability: The Trial Court Erred In Finding
Liability Based On That Unpleaded Theory.
The claim of ,fjoint liability" was mentioned for the first time in MLL's response to

Middleton's motion for directed verdict after MLL had rested. R. at 5274. See also R. at
5883, 1. 24-25, 5884, 1. 1-9. The claim was repeated on the evening prior to the last day of
testimony when plaintiff submitted a Trial Brief containing the assertion of "joint contract
liability" (Trial Brief, R. at 1479-82.)
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The Trial Brief asserted that all who signed the Amended Lease as "Landlord" are
liable as a matter of law to MLL if there is a breach of an express or implied covenant of
the Amended Lease by any of them.34
Rule 8(a) U.R.C.P. directs "a pleading . . . contain . . . a short and plain statement"
to assure the complaint gives fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim. Blackham v.
Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453 (1955). The pleading must describe the nature of the acts
complained of and the allegations sufficient to establish the basis of the plaintiffs theory of
the claim. See Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982).
Joint liability should be separately pleaded. New Jersey Office Supply, Inc. v.
Feldman, 1990 LW 74477 (U.S.D.C. N.J. 1990); Sharkey v. Lathram, 156 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio
1959).35
A case cannot be determined on an unpleaded theory unless the issue has been tried
by express or implied consent of the parties. Rule 15(b) U.R.Civ.P.; Gill v. Timm, 720 P2d
1352,1354 (Utah 1986)(no consideration of issue neither pled nor tried); Mitchell v. Palmer,
121 Utah 245, 251, 240 P.2d 970, 972 ("restricted to the ground set forth in the complaint
. . . or tried by the express or implied consent of the parties. Rule 15(b) U.R.C.P."). See
also Heitz v. Carroll. 788 P.2d 188, 191 (Idaho 1990)("the parties to an action are bound by

34

MLL claimed: "The duties of the Middletons are joint, and any breach of the Landlord's duty to the
plaintiff is a breach of the joint obligation of all the Middletons who executed the Amended Ground Lease."
Trial Brief, R. at 1480. Plaintiffs Trial Brief concludes (R. at 1481):
The execution by all of the Middletons of the Amended Ground Lease was, in and of itself,
a grant of agency to each of them "to act for the landlord."
Middletons immediately and persistently objected to plaintiffs new theory. R. at 1617, 1631.
35

"A 'shot-gun petition* leads to careless and inexact preparation for trial, and if such is allowed, neither
the defendants nor the court know what is the claim of the plaintiff, under such style of pleading -- does the
claim come under the laws relating to partnership, principal and agent, master and servant, independent
contractor, debtor and creditor, bailor and bailee, joint tort-feasors, or joint adventure?"
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the theory on which they try it")(citation omitted); see also, M.K. Transport, Inc. v. Grover,
612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Idaho 1980).36 Middletons objected to the last-minute assertion of the
claim37 and MLL never requested leave to amend its pleadings to include the claim. The
claim was not tried by express or implied consent of Middletons.
Had an issue of joint liability been timely raised, the Middletons would have had the
opportunity to discover and present evidence of the parties' intentions and discussions that
may have related to the issue, for example, with respect to the term "Landlord" in the
Amended Lease or with respect to the importance of description of the Middletons in the
lease as tenants-in-common. Perhaps the Middletons, their attorneys, or the representatives
of MLL would have given testimony regarding the intention of the parties on joint liability
in these circumstances. The failure of MLL to plead or to seek to try the issue of joint
liability deprived the Middletons of a fair opportunity for trial of the issue. For those
reasons, the court should not have considered the joint liability claim.
The trial court erred in entering judgment based on the unpleaded, untried theory
of joint liability. MLL chose the agency theory. Middletons' discovery, trial preparation, and
trial strategy, were based on that theory. These Middletons were unavoidably prejudiced by
the new issue on which they had no notice and inadequate time to do discovery or to

36

Grover involved an action being tried on a breach of contract theory. The Court granted relief on a
rescission of contract theory. That theory, however, was not raised by either party in their pleadings or at trial.
The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed, finding that the trial court is limited by Rule 15(b). Id. at 1196. "The
requirement that the unpleaded issues be tried by at least the implied consent of the parties assures that the
parties have notice of the issues before the court and an opportunity to address those issues with evidence and
argument." Grover, at 1196 citing Cook v. City of Price, Carbon County, Utah, 566 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1977).
"Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because evidence relevant to that
issue was introduced without objection. At least it must appear that the parties understood the evidence to
be aimed at the unpleaded issue." Grover, at 1196 citing MBI Motor Co., Inc. v. Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d
709 (6th Cir. 1974).
37

For instance, plaintiff submitted a proposed jury instruction that directed the jury to find joint liability
to which Middletons objected and the court rejected.
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respond. See, Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 435 (Utah 1983). See, Ringwood v.
Foreign Auto Works, Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138
(Utah 1990).
The trial court erred in allowing MLL to change its theory of the case, more than two
years after commencement of the case, and after resting at trial.
VII. MEDICAL LEASING IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES.
A.

Middletons Were Not Given The Required Notice of Default and Right to Cure.
Paragraph 16 of the Amended Lease provides:
16. Attorney's Fees. If Landlord or Tenant default hereunder or file a suit
against the other which is in any way connected with this lease, the defaulting party
shall pay to the prevailing party a reasonable sum for attorney's fees, which shall be
deemed to have accrued on the commencement of such action and shall be
enforceable whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment.

Whether Landlord or Tenant is in default is to be determined by paragraph 6 of the
Amended Lease. See Point I, supra.
Middletons were never in default under the lease because MLL failed to give
Middletons notice of any alleged default, a prerequisite to being "deemed to be in default"
under the Amended Lease. That analysis is applicable here: since Middletons were not
given the required notice, they cannot be deemed to be in default under the Lease.
B.

Attorney's Fees Are Not Awardable for Breach of Implied Obligations.
MLL has never identified any breach by defendants of the express terms of the

Lease; there is no express breach of the Amended Lease. Plaintiffs claim can only be for
breach of the covenant of good faith.
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The issue of attorney's fees for breach of an implied obligation was specifically
addressed in Cluff v. Oilmen 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976):
[T]his court has numerous times said that such a provision for attorney's fees makes
them allowable only for enforcement of the covenants in the contract. Therefore it
does not extend to implied covenants or obligations not expressly included therein.
(Emphasis added.)
Because MLL's claim for attorney's fees is based on breach of a law-imposed
covenant, there can be no recovery for contract-provided attorney's fees.
C.

The Jury Did Not Find, And Medical Leasing Did Not Request The Jury To Find,
Middletons Expressly Breached The Lease.
Even if MLL could identify a breach of an express term of the Amended Lease, MLL

still cannot recover attorney's fees. The jury verdict cannot be relied upon as determining
a breach of an express provision of the lease, because, over defendants' objection, the
special interrogatory was given in the alternative. See Special Interrogatory No. 4:
Did the defendants, or any of them, breach the express terms of the Amended
Ground Lease and/or their implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to
Medical Leasing?
Though the jury answered this "and/or" question "yes" as to Anthony and Carol, there was
no determination by the jury that these Middletons breached an express term of the Lease.
This case is exactly like McKenzie v. Kaiser-Aetna, 127 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1976). There,
plaintiff asserted various theories of recovery including breach of a written contract and
breach of an implied warranty. Plaintiffs action was successful, but the trial court denied
attorney's fees, saying:
Plaintiff has not sustained his burden of proof to establish that the portion of the jury
verdict and judgment in plaintiffs favor against defendant was based on the written
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contract which contains the provisions regarding attorney's fees, as opposed to having
been based upon breach of . . . an implied warranty, or one or more of plaintiffs
other theories not constituting an action on a contract which specifically provides for
attorney's fees.
Id. The decision was affirmed, with the appellant court stating:
The net verdict and judgment were in appellant's favor, but there is no way to
ascertain, in the absence of special jury findings, on which of the theories of recovery
fbreach of contract . . . or breach of implied warranty) the jury mainly based its
award to appellant.
(Emphasis added.) Id.
MLL has not met its burden here. MLL cannot now establish that the jury found a
breach of an express provision of the Amended Lease. Therefore, MLL cannot recover
attorney's fees.
D.

Medical Leasing's Claim is Defective For Failing To Set Out The Time And Fees
Expended For Unsuccessful Claims And Claims For Which There Is No Entitlement
To Attorney's Fees,
Of the substantive claims of Counts I through IV of MLL's original complaint, only

Count II contained a contractual claim under the Amended Lease, the other claims being
claims in tort or for injunctive relief, for which attorney's fees are not allowable under the
terms of the attorney's fee provision of the Amended Lease.
In Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah 1992), this Court reversed an award
of attorney's fees, stating:
One who seeks an award of attorney's fees must set out the time and fees
expended for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to
attorney's fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an
entitlement to attorney's fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which
there is no entitlement to attorney's fees. See Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc.
v. Ironwood Exploration. Inc.. 766 P.2d 1074, 1079-80 (Utah 1988); Travner v.
Cushing. 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984).
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See Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984):
[A] party is entitled only to those fees attributable to the successful vindication of
contractual rights within the terms of their agreement.
Id. at 858. As it did in the Cottonwood Mall case, the Supreme Court reversed the
attorney's fee award in Travner v. Cushing.
MLL is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for its claims of interference with
contract, interference with prospective economic relations, or breach of covenant of good
faith. The interference with contract claim was dismissed. MLL, under the Cottonwood
Mall v. Sine and Travner v. Cushing standards, is not entitled to attorney's fees for a
complaint which was dismissed for failure to state a claim.

All time associated with

preparing the complaint, responding to the Motion to Dismiss and preparing for and
attending the hearing, must be disallowed. MLL has failed to allocate the fees claimed
between these non-fee claims and its claim of breach of contract.
The claim also included $25,000 for the cost of MLL's damage expert. That cost is
not recoverable as attorneys' fees. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686-87 (Utah App.
1990).
MLL's entire claim is defective and should be entirely disallowed for plaintiffs failure
to designate the time and fees expended for claims for which there is no entitlement to
attorney's fees.
VIII. IF THE JUDGMENT IS REVERSED, MIDDLETONS MAY BE THE
PREVAILING PARTY AND ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES;
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD DETERMINE THE ENTITLEMENT
AND AMOUNT OF FEES.
If the judgment is reversed, Middletons may be the prevailing party. Paragraph 16
of the Amended Lease provides the defaulting party shall pay attorneys' fees. See text of
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5 16 at Point VILA., supra. These Middletons qualify for attorney's fees under this provision
as they gave MLL notice in their Answer and Counterclaim. R. at 411, 424. However, it
also provides that if MLL files a suit against Middletons "in any way connected with this
lease" the prevailing party shall be paid its attorney's fees. If the judgment is reveised, these
Middletons may be prevailing parties.
This Court should remand to the trial court to determine Middletons' eligibility for
fees and the amount.
CONCLUSION
The bottom line is the judgment against these Middletons is not proper. The jury
found in favor of these Middletons on all claims. MLL failed to provide notice to
Middletons, as required by the Amended Lease. MLL knew that Anthony did not represent
these Middletons. Ownership of the property by Middletons as tenants-in-common defeats
MLL's claim against these Middletons, and MLL did not plead a joint liability theory.
The judgment against these Middletons must be reversed with instructions to the trial
court to dismiss MLL's claims with prejudice.
DATED: February 8, 1993.
Respectfully submitted,
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